Reviewed in the United States on August 24, 2012
I'm reluctant to "blame" Choudhury for proposing a theory that was dictated, probably, by the best knowledge he had available at the time. Unfortunately, from a 21st-century standpoint, claiming that the "people of East Bengal" should understand the United States was the best friend it had among any of the powers? Nowadays, we know better.

When we now know (and have known for a time) that the United States had been put in the highly unenviable position of deciding between its longterm ally of Pakistan (the Islamabad government) and brutal violence mass murder (sometimes termed flat-out genocide) in Bangladesh. Declassified documents (like Roedad Khan's compilation, "The American Papers") now tell us that Nixon and Kissinger was not as dumb or naive as Choudhury would like to think. They made a calculated decision to support Pakistan in its violent pursuit of national territory, one that was hardly unpopular in the major US media and in many nations (including China), and kept it in response to India's invasion in December of 1971. The idea that, thanks to US aid (which Choudhury correctly estimates, but fails to recognize didn't reach East Bengal, as local historians now point out), the United States was the best friend of Bengal, while simultaneously remaining true to its commitments to a stalwart partner in the region, Pakistan, is just pretty ridiculous. What happened to this naivety when he warned potential Bengal readers of Soviet commitment only being part of their reflection of their "traditional pursuit of hegemony"? As though the United States is never interested in the pursuit of power, only humanitarian causes?